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Regulating Off-Label Promotion — A Critical Test
Christopher Robertson, J.D., Ph.D., and Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., J.D., M.P.H.

I

n 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit handed down a landmark decision in the
case of pharmaceutical sales representative Alfred
Caronia. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

had approved sodium oxybate
(Xyrem) for treating narcolepsy,
but Caronia promoted it for a wide
range of nonapproved (off-label)
indications, including insomnia,
Parkinson’s disease, and fibromyalgia. Off-label use is common,
especially in specialties such as
oncology, in which it may even be
considered the standard of care.
However, surveys have revealed
that supporting evidence is lacking for a majority of off-label
uses of medical products.1 The uses
Caronia proposed were not based
on high-quality data and were likely to cause patients substantial
harm (sodium oxybate, or gammahydroxybutyrate, is also known
as the “date-rape drug” in nonclinical use).
Nonetheless, because prosecutors relied on Caronia’s own words

to show that he intended the drug
to be used for nonapproved purposes, in violation of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
the appeals court reversed the conviction, holding that Caronia’s sales
pitches were protected commercial
speech under the First Amendment.
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the conception of what counts as “speech”
in the eyes of the law and has
generally increased its legal protections. For example, in a 2011
case, the Court held that protected
speech included sales data used by
pharmaceutical manufacturers to
more efficiently target marketing
to physicians.
Still, the Caronia decision subverted decades of presumptions
about how the government could
oversee the behavior of the phar-
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maceutical and medical device industries. For over 50 years, the
FDCA has required that drugs (and
later, high-risk devices) be labeled
for all uses intended by their manufacturers and that their safety
and efficacy for those uses be first
demonstrated in clinical trials. The
FDA created “safe harbors” allowing companies to distribute peerreviewed literature or answer physician questions. However, until
the Second Circuit’s Caronia decision, if a company promoted intended uses that had not been FDAapproved, that promotion would
be clear evidence that the product
was misbranded and that its sale
for those uses was illegal. The
fact that the work of pharmaceutical sales representatives involved
speech did not matter before
Caronia.
Many observers worried that if
other federal courts, or even the
Supreme Court, adopted Caronia’s
holding, it could adversely affect
the U.S. health care system, by substituting marketing for science.
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Manufacturers could secure FDA
approval of products for very narrow indications on the basis of
highly limited data and then
widely promote case series, poorly
designed trials, and inadequately
controlled observational “realworld” evidence to support additional uses, to the potential detriment of patients and payers.
Since that decision, the government has continued to obtain
large settlements in investigations
of off-label promotion, which suggests that the pre-Caronia approach
still carries some weight. Yet two
subsequent Second Circuit cases

approved the broader contested
indication, averting any court decision that would add further
weight to Caronia and Amarin.
Legal battles have also erupted
in at least two other federal circuits. These cases involve whistleblowers who reported off-label
marketing by manufacturers of
high-risk medical devices. A Texas
jury found executives not guilty,
but a Massachusetts jury convicted
two executives. In the latter case
(Facteau), the prosecutors alleged
that although the company sought
FDA approval for a narrow use of
its device for opening up sinuses,

Should the FDA or the courts evaluate product claims?
Congress established the FDA’s premarketing approval
process to channel claims about safety and efficacy
into an expert agency, where the claims can be
evaluated rigorously and independently
on the basis of submitted evidence.
have followed Caronia’s precedent.
In a 2015 case involving a prescription fish oil approved for
treating patients with very high
triglyceride levels, Amarin Pharmaceuticals sought to promote the
product for patients with moderately high levels, an indication
that the FDA did not consider
scientifically valid absent additional supporting data.2 Instead
of developing and providing those
data, Amarin went to court. After
the FDA received an unfavorable
preliminary decision, it settled
the case, letting the manufacturer
make its contested claims and
even providing a special preclearance pathway for future claims
Amarin might want to make. In
another 2015 case involving the
off-label use of a postsurgical
pain-relief drug, the FDA hastily
2314

it had always intended to market
it for broader uses for delivering
drugs. The jury convicted the two
executives of 10 misdemeanor
counts.
When the Facteau case is ultimately reviewed by the First Circuit, it will be the first real test
of Caronia’s reasoning outside the
Second Circuit. The prosecutor’s
strategy has been to emphasize
that the Facteau jury, unlike the
Caronia jury, was instructed to rely
not merely on speech in determining whether the product was misbranded, but on actions as well.
We do not see how that point
helps, since the prosecution still
relied on the defendants’ speech
— including e-mail messages,
phone calls, training videos, and
marketing brochures — as evidence of their illegal intent to
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sell a misbranded product. If the
Constitution forbids doing A —
as Caronia held — it would also
forbid doing A+B.
Instead, we believe that the
First Circuit and other courts need
to reject Caronia on its merits. The
FDCA’s intent requirement is like
innumerable other laws that require juries to determine whether
a party had a certain intent when
undertaking certain acts. It may
be perfectly legal to buy a gun or
drive across state lines, but if a
defendant’s own speech reveals he
or she did so as part of a conspiracy to sell cocaine or a murderfor-hire plot, that speech is routinely used to prove the illegal
intent. Before Caronia, such uses
of speech as evidence were not
considered violations of the First
Amendment.
Defendants in these cases are
also trying to lure the courts into
evaluating whether their off-label
promotional claims are true or
false. Though the First Amendment does not protect false and
fraudulent speech, the principle is
irrelevant to a misbranding case.3
(Similarly, in a cocaine case, the
defendant’s speech may be used
as evidence of an illegal intent,
regardless of whether it is true.)
The more important question
is: Should the FDA or the courts
evaluate product claims? Congress
established the FDA’s premarketing approval process to channel
claims about safety and efficacy
into an expert agency, where the
claims can be evaluated rigorously and independently on the basis
of submitted evidence. The process thus creates an incentive for
companies to undertake the scientific research that is required
for FDA approval, an incentive
that applies to both original intended uses and new uses. In fact,
about half of the FDA’s approvals
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each year are for new uses of previously approved drugs, which turn
off-label uses into on-label ones.4
This gateway function remains a
key way of ensuring that health
care is based on robust science,
so that patients are protected and
wasteful spending is minimized.
Still, sensing that the time may
be ripe for a major policy shift,
the drug and bioAn audio interview
logics industry rewith Dr. Robertson
cently released prois available at NEJM.org
posed guidelines for
a new approach to off-label promotion.5 They seek a rollback of
FDA regulation, so that they can
instead “responsibly” promote new
uses to physicians, even beyond
the safe harbors the FDA already
allows. The FDA, for its part, is
undertaking a comprehensive review of its rules about off-label
promotion.
We fear that these developments could be the beginning of

an FDA retreat from the FDCA’s
fundamental precepts, which require that basic standards for
proof of safety and efficacy be
met for every intended use of a
drug or high-risk medical device.
Rather than acceding to the
views of two judges in one federal circuit, we hope that the FDA
continues to stand on principle.
The U.S. Constitution should
not be misconstrued in such a
way as to undermine the primary functions of federal regulation in this area: to protect
patients and to create a highquality market for drugs and
devices that is driven by science
rather than hype.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available at NEJM.org.
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NIH Policy on Single-IRB Review — A New Era in Multicenter
Studies
Ann‑Margret Ervin, Ph.D., M.P.H., Holly A. Taylor, Ph.D., M.P.H., and Stephan Ehrhardt, M.D., M.P.H.

R

eview of the ethics of multicenter clinical studies is typically conducted by the institutional
review board (IRB) of each participating center. Extensive evidence
suggests that the current practice
is costly, is unnecessarily duplicative, and delays commencement of
research.1 The U.S. government has
permitted single-IRB review and
other streamlined review models
since 1991, but few investigators
have taken advantage of those
options.2
In June 2016, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued
new guidance on single-IRB re-

view of multicenter studies.3 The
policy was introduced as a means
to increase the efficiency of multicenter studies, reduce the time
to study initiation, promote consistency of ethics review, alleviate the burden on investigators
and administrators, and eventually reduce research costs. Under
the new policy, U.S. centers participating in NIH-funded multicenter studies must use a single
IRB for initial and ongoing ethics
review. As of May 25, 2017, this
policy will apply to investigators
submitting applications for nonexempt multicenter studies involv-
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ing human participants and using
a common study protocol. The
policy does not apply if it is prohibited by “federal, tribal, or state
law, regulation or policy.”3 The
NIH will consider other exceptions
with appropriate justification.
The single-IRB policy ushers in
new and important responsibilities for investigators. A proposal
for use of a single IRB must be
included with the initial application, and at that time all involved
U.S. institutions must agree to use
the selected IRB. If funding is
awarded, federal guidance requires
a signed IRB-authorization agree-
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